mcp-nmap-server
- Commit it fails on
- "Add files via upload", January 9, 2025
- Path the check reports
- MCP tool call from an AI agent →
runNmapScan: process/shell execution - Advisory published
- March 3, 2026, about 14 months later
CodeMD Call-Path Security · Our own testing on public advisories
We took published command-injection vulnerabilities in open-source MCP servers, went back to the commit that added each bug, and ran the CodeMD Call-Path Security check on it, exactly as it checks a pull request.
These are results from our own test, with a link to every public advisory and commit so you can check them yourself. They show what the check found in these 14 cases; they aren't a guarantee it will find every issue in your code.
In each one, a tool an AI agent can call passes its input to a shell command. All are fixed now; this isn't a criticism of the maintainers. Links go to the public advisory and the commit the check would have failed.
runNmapScan: process/shell executionMaigretServer.execCommand: process/shell executionregisterSPMTools: process/shell executioncreateServer → Markdownify.toMarkdown → Markdownify._markitdown: process/shell executionexecuteMagerun2Command: process/shell executionPackageDocsServer.searchPackageDocs, plus 5 more functions that run local Go and Python tooling: process/shell executioninstallHelmChart → executeHelmCommand: process/shell executionimportTmx: process/shell executionregisterGitMergeTool → gitMergeLogic: process/shell executionSmartBranchTool.branch, plus 23 more functions in its git and system tools: process/shell executionfetchWithRetry: process/shell execution, network callStataDo._execute_windows, plus 1 more function: process/shell executionThese bugs were in the repository from its first commit. The check flags the path, but a repository's first check only records a starting point, so today it would show ✓. Installing the app before writing the code, or a full scan with the Security panel on Analyze Repo, would show them.
executeAdbCommand: process/shell executionSemgrepServer.handleScanDirectory, plus 7 more handlers: process/shell executionThe same review CodeMD runs on your pull requests, run on real products. It found real bugs, not style nits, across security, correctness, reliability and data integrity. Every one was fixed.
| Category | What it protects |
|---|---|
| Security | Your code and data stay yours. |
| Correctness | Results you can trust. |
| Reliability | Work that finishes, every time. |
| Data integrity | Nothing you saved is lost or overwritten. |
Counts are our own findings, not an outside audit.
A public Sentry workflow shows a different problem CodeMD is designed to avoid: a large change produced so much repeated file-list data that the tool deciding what should run could not start.
meta(deploy)actions/github-script input. Overlapping categories repeated hundreds of paths: 418 testable files, 421 type-checkable files, 429 frontend-lint files and 704 acceptance files.Argument list too long. The runner could not start Node, so the script never classified the change.CodeMD did not run on this repository. This is an independently observed public CI failure that demonstrates the scaling problem, not a claim that CodeMD found or fixed Sentry's workflow.
A public Sentry workflow shows a different problem CodeMD is designed to avoid: a large change produced so much repeated file-list data that the tool deciding what should run could not start.
meta(deploy)actions/github-script input. Overlapping categories repeated hundreds of paths: 418 testable files, 421 type-checkable files, 429 frontend-lint files and 704 acceptance files.Argument list too long. The runner could not start Node, so the script never classified the change.CodeMD did not run on this repository. This is an independently observed public CI failure that demonstrates the scaling problem, not a claim that CodeMD found or fixed Sentry's workflow.
execAsync = promisify(exec), tool handlers registered outside a function, typed server.tool<…>( registrations, and calls inside nested callbacks.A failed check shows a path from outside input to a shell command. It doesn't prove the command is built unsafely: a reviewer decides that, with the AI verdict that CodeMD Pro adds to the check.
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